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ABSTRACT
One of the most striking developments in the global economy
in the past decades is the rapid proliferation of preferential
trade agreements (PTAs), with many of them concluded
among or with participation of developing countries. On the
presumption that current popular debates on trade policy are
not so much about whether citizens want free trade but rather
what kinds of trade liberalization they want, we examine indi-
vidual trade policy preferences with regard to PTAs that can
vary in content along several dimensions. To that end we
carried out conjoint choice experiments embedded in repre-
sentative surveys in three developing countries that differ
strongly in income levels, political system, and trade liberal-
ization history: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. We con-
ceptualize trade policy preferences as preferences over the
scale and scope of trade liberalization, environmental and
labor standards, and labor market access (migration). Two
main findings emerge. First, non-economic considerations,
such as sympathy/antipathy toward particular countries and
environmental and labor rights concerns influence citizens’
preferences at least as much as factors based on standard
economic logic. Second, preferences over particular facets
(attributes) of trade liberalization, that is PTA content, are
surprisingly consistent across countries, despite strong differ-
ences in macro-economic and political context.
KEYWORDS
Conjoint experiments;
preferential trade
agreements; public opinion
While trade liberalization efforts within the multilateral framework of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) have stalled since the turn of the millen-
nium, the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has continued to
grow at a spectacular pace up to the present. One of the main reasons for this
development is that PTAs provide participating countries with flexibility in
view of both picking their partner countries and the content of these agree-
ments (Dür et al. 2014). By addressing behind the border regulations, such as
those concerning the environment, worker rights, migration, investment, or
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government procurement, modern PTAs cover more sectors and regulate
more economic issues than the WTO agreements.
Developing countries have been a very important part of this trend toward
regionalism and bilateralism in trade policy (Dür and Elsig 2015). As of now,
a majority of PTAs either include developing countries among their members
or are formed exclusively between two or more developing countries.1 The
great and continuing importance of PTAs for developing countries has
motivated a considerable amount of academic research on this issue. Most
of this research focuses, from a macro-level perspective, either on why
developing countries enter into PTAs (Baccini and Urpelainen 2012; Baier
and Bergstrand 2004; Baldwin 2011; Hicks and Kim 2012; Manger and
Shadlen 2014), or on economic and other (for example environmental or
social) implications of joining PTAs (Bechtel and Tosun 2009; Hafner-
Burton 2005; Spilker and Böhmelt 2013).
Very little research seeks to explain public attitudes toward trade liberal-
ization in developing countries (Baker 2003; Bernauer and Nguyen 2015;
Urbatsch 2013); and there is virtually no research on what kinds of PTAs – in
terms of specific features and content of PTAs – citizens in developing countries
prefer. Yet, we believe that such research is important for at least two reasons.
First, while, overall, PTAs are clearly designed to liberalize trade, such agree-
ments can differ along several dimensions, for example, the number of countries
involved, whether and how they regulate labor market access, whether environ-
mental and labor standards are addressed, and how, and which sectors they deal
with (see Dür et al. 2014). In view of historic and more recent intense public
debates over PTAs and various aspects thereof, for instance in the context of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), or the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), we need to understand how citizens form their preferences toward PTAs
and what PTA features matter most in this regard. Hence we believe that the
“real” issue in trade policy is usually notwhether government, firms, and citizens
want free trade or not, but what kinds of trade liberalization they want. Second,
on the presumption that policy-makers usually seek to align their policy choices
with prevailing public opinion, understanding trade policy preferences can also
help account for existing and anticipate future policy choices.
To the best of our knowledge, the research presented in this article is the
first to try and fill this gap. Building on existing trade theories, we identify a
set of PTA characteristics (attributes) that are likely to matter when citizens
form their preferences toward PTAs, and formulate expectations on how
these characteristics are likely to affect preferences. We then test these
expectations (hypotheses) by means of a conjoint choice experiment, which
was embedded in surveys carried out with representative samples in three
1For an overview of PTAs see www.designoftradeagreements.org.
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developing countries: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. The choice of
these three countries is motivated by the fact that while all of them are
developing countries they differ strongly with respect to income levels,
political systems, and environmental and social standards. Consequently,
we are interested in finding out, to what extent, particular PTA character-
istics matter for public opinion formation in similar ways across very differ-
ent economic and political contexts in the “Global South.”
In our conjoint experiment, respondents were asked to evaluate and
express their preferences with respect to (stylized) pairs of potential PTAs
their government negotiated. Because the different attributes of each poten-
tial PTA (for example involved partner countries, labor market access,
environmental standards of other countries) were designed as experimental
treatment conditions and were randomly assigned to participants, we are able
to estimate the relative influence of each attribute value on the resulting
choice or rating of the (hypothetical) PTAs (Hainmueller et al. 2014). In
other words, our empirical research is set up in a way that allows for causal
inference with respect to specific contents (attributes) of PTAs that make
people more or less supportive of PTAs.
The empirical results show that conventional arguments focusing on re-
distributional (economic) implications of trade liberalization have rather limited
explanatory value in a multi-dimensional choice setting. While agreements
implicating a reduction in price substantively increase support, sympathy or
antipathy toward particular countries seems to matter even more than purely
economic considerations. Finally, preferences over different facets (attributes) of
trade liberalization including environmental and worker rights concerns are
very similar across countries, despite strong differences in economic and poli-
tical conditions.
While these results are interesting in academic terms, they also have
important policy implications. In the context of current debates on PTAs,
it often seems as if large parts of the general public oppose trade agreements
as such. However, our results suggest that this should depend to a significant
degree on how the specific agreements are designed. While clearly extreme
trade skeptics might not be convinced by even the most favorable design of a
trade agreement, those who hold less extreme views on trade should, accord-
ing to our results, be more likely to adapt their support for a respective PTA
depending on its design. Given that particular trade-related issues, for exam-
ple worker rights, environmental standards, and rules on migration, can be
incorporated into PTAs in differing ways, the potential for achieving suffi-
cient public support for PTAs may, depending on what PTA design choices
are made, actually be higher than is oftentimes assumed.
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Public opinion on trade: state of the art
Most political economy research on individual trade policy preferences, that
is, mass public opinion concerning trade liberalization or protectionism, is
strongly informed by macro-level trade theories. From such theories, indivi-
dual preferences over a one-dimensional policy space, ranging from support
for to opposition against free trade, can be derived. This general approach to
the study of public opinion on trade liberalization lines up well with the
common assumption in the literature that macro models explaining aggre-
gate (collective level) outcomes must ultimately rest on empirically valid
assumptions about individual level preferences and behavior.
Theoretical accounts of individual trade preferences typically derive these
preferences by focusing on the redistributive (economic) effects of trade
liberalization. In this context, the two most common theoretical models of
international trade underlying existing research are the factor endowments
(or Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O)) and the specific factors (or Ricardo–Viner)
model (Oatley 2012). According to the H–O model, the winners and losers
of trade liberalization are based on ownership of production factors. For
industrialized countries, the H–O model predicts that highly skilled indivi-
duals, that is, the owners of the abundant production factor in richer
countries, tend (on average) to gain from trade liberalization while people
with lower skills tend to lose. On the presumption that individuals know
what the consequences of trade liberalization will be for them personally, and
that their preferences are a function of economic self-interest, higher-skilled
people are likely to support free trade, lower-skilled people not. In developing
countries, where the main comparative advantage is less skilled and cheaper
labor, the H–O framework offers the converse prediction: lower-skilled
persons are likely to support free trade, higher-skilled persons not.
In contrast, the specific factors model, also known as the Ricardo–Viner
(R-V) framework, singles out sectors as the main driving force of trade
preferences. The R–V model holds that skills of individuals are often hard
to transfer from one sector to another. It thus predicts that individuals
working in comparatively advantaged sectors (that is sectors that will gain
from trade liberalization) should be in favor of trade liberalization, whereas
individuals who work in internationally exposed but less competitive indus-
tries should oppose trade liberalization. What both accounts have in com-
mon is that economic self-interest serves as the main motive for individual
level trade preferences.
A considerable body of literature in political economy examines the degree
to which these expectations are empirically relevant (Baker 2003, 2005;
Beaulieu 2002; Beaulieu et al. 2005; Blonigen 2008, 2011; Hainmueller and
Hiscox 2006; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke
et al. 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Walter 2010). With regard to the
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validity of the H–O versus the R–V framework, most of these studies find
some support for the H–O model (Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Mayda and
Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke et al. 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). However,
due to a lack of reliable data on respondents’ sectoral employment, most
research either does not test the sectoral (R–V) model’s predictions at all or
often uses proxies that inadequately measure the underlying theoretical
argument. To the extent the R–V model is tested, results have been mixed
(Walter 2010).
While the existing literature offers a wealth of valuable insights into how
individuals form their preferences on trade issues, three limitations remain.
First, most studies view trade preferences as a one-dimensional concept, and
correspondingly rely on one single survey item to measure individual level
trade preferences. Besides the obvious problem of measurement error that
may result from using a single survey item, both trade policy debates among
experts as well as the mass public and the media discourse on trade issues
strongly suggest that trade policy is multi- and not one-dimensional. While
policy-makers and citizens do eventually aggregate preferences over multiple
facets of trade policy into a general preference, for instance with respect to a
particular proposal for a trade agreement, jumping to a one-dimensional
overall measure in empirical research misses out on a lot of potentially
interesting information.
Shifting away from a one-dimensional analytical perspective is also helpful
in addressing a second limitation of the existing literature. Empirical testing
of the H–O and R–V frameworks has thus far produced mixed or rather
weak findings. Several recent contributions therefore question whether cor-
relations between education level – the typical measure for skill level – and
free trade support are actually a meaningful test of the H–O hypothesis. The
reason is that education level tends to be also correlated with cosmopolitan
attitudes and more knowledge of economics (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006).
This means that the often times observed correlation of education level and
free trade support may reflect an ideational or knowledge effect, rather than a
factor endowments effect. This limitation is important because existing
empirical work has, thus far, offered more support for the H–O than for
the R–V framework.
Recent research also questions the usefulness of the H–O and R–V frame-
works for explaining trade preferences of individuals from another view-
point. Various studies show that people know rather little about trade policy,
but do express preferences when prompted in surveys to do so (Guisinger
2009). When trying to form and express opinions on trade policy under
conditions of little information and knowledge, respondents tend to resort to
elite cues as well as their own general world views, beliefs, and attitudes in
order to (quickly, in the context of a survey) “make up their mind.” Several
recent studies in fact show that political ideology, cosmopolitan attitudes,
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environmental attitudes, socio-tropic economic considerations, and other
factors – taken together – have larger effects on trade preferences than
predictors derived from the H–O and R–V frameworks (Bernauer and
Nguyen 2015; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Rho and Tomz 2017). Hence the
question arises to what degree the distributional effects of free trade, as
emphasized by the H–O and R–V frameworks, are indeed the main drivers
of individual level trade preferences?
Finally, the vast majority of studies empirically concentrate on advanced
industrialized countries, above all the United States (Blonigen 2008, 2011;
Fordham and Kleinberg 2012; Rho and Tomz 2017). A few other studies
focus on Canada (Beaulieu 2002), Switzerland (Bechtel et al. 2012; Spilker
et al. 2012), Japan (Naoi and Kume 2011), or rely on international omnibus
surveys, such as the Eurobarometer or the World Values Survey (Baker 2005;
Gabel 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Schaffer and Spilker 2015). However,
only very little research centers on trade policy preferences in middle-income
and/or developing countries (Baker 2003; Lü et al. 2012; Spilker et al. 2016).
In this article, we address several of the aforementioned limitations in
existing research. We rely on an experimental approach, and a conjoint
experiment in particular, to identify causes of trade preferences, whereas
most existing work is based on correlational analysis. Moreover, using a
conjoint experiment enables us to examine trade preferences in terms of
preferences over a multi-dimensional policy space, in which several of the
facets (attributes) of trade policy to be examined are non-economic (for
example environmental or social concerns).2 Finally, the empirical analysis
here focuses on three developing countries that differ strongly in income
levels, political system, and trade liberalization history: Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, and Vietnam.
Theoretical arguments
In principle, trade policy can vary in many different ways across countries, time,
and agreements. Based on empirically observed differences between PTAs (http://
www.designoftradeagreements.org) and a review of past and current debates on
trade liberalizationworldwide (Baldwin 2011;Dür et al. 2014;Manger and Shadlen
2014), we focus on four crucial dimensions of trade liberalization: scale and scope
of trade liberalization, standards, and labor market access. Table 1 summarizes
these dimensions as well as their subcategories, which, in our experiment, are
presented to participants in the form of a proposed PTA having these features. For
each of the four trade policy dimensions, we then outline in the following para-
graphs the expected effect on individual trade preferences in developing countries.
2The only other studies we know of that use conjoint choice experiments to study trade policy preferences vis-à-vis
PTAs are by Spilker et al. (2016) and Umaña et al. (2015). However, those studies focus on trade partner
characteristics, and not on PTA design features.
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As noted further below, this set of arguments and PTA design features results in a
rather complex but empirically quite realistic (in view of what PTA features appear
in public debates) experimental setup.
Scale of liberalization
We assess the scale of liberalization via two specific attributes (characteris-
tics) of PTAs. The first – the number of participating countries – captures the
scale of liberalization in, arguably, its simplest form.3 The second subcategory
then focuses on which precise countries are involved.
Number of participating countries
We hypothesize that citizens are likely to prefer PTAs with a smaller number
of partner countries to PTAs with higher numbers. The reason is that, with
fewer countries, perceived uncertainty is likely to be lower as individuals are
better able to identify ex-ante their gains emanating from these agreements
(Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Wei and Frankel 1996). PTAs in contrast to
multilateral liberalization à la WTO allow for a more tailor-made liberal-
ization in that certain sectors that would lose under multilateral liberalization
could be excluded ex-ante in a preferential trade liberalization process.
Furthermore, sectors that, potentially, cannot successfully compete under a
multilateral liberalization regime, might win in a preferential trade liberal-
ization process because their comparative advantages are enough to make
gains in this specific, typically regional, market (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991;
Wei and Frankel 1996). This implies that due to the specific selection of
partner countries for a PTA typically fewer sectors in the economy are
adversely affected.
Conversely, multilateral liberalization, that is liberalization on a big scale
involving many countries, is likely to encounter more political opposition
because many people are uncertain about their economic fate and may believe
they could lose from this liberalization process (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991;
Wei and Frankel 1996). Thus, in essence, it should be easier for individuals to
identify gains and losses from a trade agreement with one or very few other
countries while the distributional effects of multilateral liberalization depend on
the exchange of market access commitments between more than 160 countries
(the current setup in the World Trade Organization).
3We are aware that there is a potential trade-off between the scale of an agreement and its scope. Thus, it might
be that a PTA that is very extensive in its membership might be rather shallow and does therefore not lead to
much de facto liberalization. However, using a conjoint experimental setting is designed to deal with exactly
these types of situations. Since our experiment includes both the scale of an agreement, in the form of
membership, and the scope of an agreement, in the form of the particular liberalization an agreement would
involve, we can estimate which of the two aspects is more important to individuals in forming their opinion
about a particular PTA.
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Specific countries involved
Besides the sheer number of countries involved, specific countries are likely
to matter as well. Recent research on public support for international trade
agreements (Gray and Hicks 2014; Hearn 2013; Spilker et al. 2016; Umaña
et al. 2015) shows that not only specific characteristics of countries, in a
stylized sense, matter for trade preferences, but also the general image of
these countries. In view of informational constraints, individuals tend to rely
on the name of specific countries as heuristics and attach positive or negative
images to them. For example, due to historical animosity between the two
countries, PTAs including Costa Rica are likely to be viewed less favorably by
Nicaraguans than PTAs with other countries, and vice versa. Similarly, due to
military and security rivalries PTAs including China could be perceived more
negatively in Vietnam compared to PTAs with other large economies.4
We therefore include in all three surveys the United States, the European
Union (EU) and the BRIC countries, that is Brazil, Russia, India and China,
as potential countries involved in the liberalization process. The reason for
choosing these countries is twofold: First, these countries are the major
players in the worldwide economy and hence their market size renders
them attractive international trading partners. Second, these countries repre-
sent very different geographical regions therefore including countries in close
vicinity of the survey country (for example the United States for Costa Rica
and Nicaragua and China for Vietnam) and countries further away (for
example the EU).
The only exception we have made was that for both Costa Rica and
Nicaragua we excluded Russia since trade ties are not very developed
between these countries. Instead we included Venezuela and Costa Rica in
the case of Nicaragua and Venezuela and Nicaragua in the case of Costa Rica
in order to represent the most important neighboring markets.
Scope of liberalization
Concerning the scope of liberalization we focus on two aspects: The agree-
ment’s likely impact on consumer prices and its effects on employment. Since
we differentiate the latter category by sector, this allows us to obtain a better
understanding of the implications of the R–V framework for individual level
trade preferences.
4While this approach might consume a lot of variation across agreements because reading specific countries by
name is more salient than other dimensions, we consider this to be the most conservative approach. Without
naming countries by name individuals might still imagine specific countries without us being able to explicitly
control for it.
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Consumer prices
While it seems uncontroversial to argue that citizens should prefer trade agree-
ments that lower consumer prices since this benefits them directly, the question
that arises here is not so much whether this effect will materialize, but how large
it is relative to other determinants. Especially for individuals in developing
countries, consumption is likely to be very salient (Baker 2003). In contrast to
industrialized countries, individuals in developing countries tend to spend a
larger share of their income on the consumption of basic goods. Thus a decrease
in the price of these goods implies an immediate and substantive welfare
increase (Baker 2005). Consequently, we expect this factor to matter quite
strongly, potentially crowding out other aspects of the liberalization process.
Employment
In addition to their effect on consumer prices in general, trade agreements
tend to affect employment. While, again, we do not expect respondents to
prefer an agreement that reduces employment over an agreement that main-
tains current levels of or even increases employment, the interesting issue
with the employment dimension is sectoral. Several studies argue that the
main reason why the agricultural sector receives disproportionally high levels
of subsidies and other forms of protection from trade is rooted in the sector’s
image. Most citizens consider agriculture to be an important part of a
country’s economy and cultural heritage, and therefore support its protection
(Jensen and Shin 2014; Naoi and Kume 2011). Following these arguments,
we expect a particularly negative effect of job losses in the agricultural sector
independently of the sector of employment of the respective respondent.
Furthermore, following the predictions of the R–V framework as outlined
above, job losses in a respondent’s sector of employment are likely to be
perceived more negatively than job losses in the other sectors. This should be
the case because an agreement resulting in job losses in a respondent’s sector
should serve as an informational heuristic on his/her individual job security.
Hence individuals could infer from the general statement that jobs will be
lost in their sector of employment that their own jobs are potentially unsafe
too (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Since, according to the R–V framework,
individuals typically cannot relocate jobs between sectors without costs, one
should expect, following this logic, that individuals tend to react to job losses
in their own sector with increased opposition to trade liberalization.
Environment and labor standards
In contrast to the WTO, PTAs have become particularly prominent fora for
linking trade policy with labor and environmental standards (Cottier 2002;
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Hafner-Burton 2005; Spilker and Böhmelt 2013). The literature focusing on
social and environmental policies typically explains the different commit-
ment levels across countries via differences in public opinion or public
demand for such policies (Bernauer and Böhmelt 2013). Building on the
idea of post-material value systems, particularly prominent in the trade-
environment literature, differences in income levels are seen as the main
cause for the variation in environmental and social policy preferences: with
increasing income levels individual demand for stronger social policies and
higher environmental standards tends to grow (Anderson 1997; Bechtel et al.
2012; Ferrantino 1997; Franzen and Meyer 2010; Spilker 2013).
Hence by implication, citizens’ demand for trade agreements that also
mandate high environmental and/or social standards is likely to increase
with a country’s economic development level. Consequently, one should
expect that for citizens from developing countries, unlike those from
advanced economies, high environmental and/or labor standards should
not be an important feature of PTAs.
Bernauer and Nguyen (2015) have shown, however, that this hypothesis
rests on shaky empirical grounds, and that sacrificing environmental quality
at the expense of welfare increasing trade liberalization may be less popular
among the general population than among part of the economic and political
elite in developing countries. Similar arguments could be made with respect
to labor standards. This generates two opposing expectations and requires
empirical clarification. On the one hand, following the post-materialism
argument, one should expect citizens in developing countries to dislike
trade agreements that include stronger environmental and labor standards,
relative to the status quo standards in the country. On the other hand,
because “ordinary” citizens are usually at the receiving end of polluting
production and weak labor standards, one could expect them to support
PTAs including enhanced environmental and labor standards. That is, they
should support high standards in PTAs in order to “import” such standards
from trade partner countries that already have higher standards.
Labor market access
While global trade agreements in the framework of the WTO do not deal
with labor market issues, many PTAs do. One should expect this issue to be
very sensitive and salient from the perspective of citizens. The reason is that
labor market access has – via immigration – direct economic implications for
citizens, whereas trade liberalization per se typically impacts indirectly on
domestic labor markets by affecting imports and exports and employment
risks in the sectors affected. PTAs can include various arrangements for labor
market access. In our study, we use a characterization that focuses on skill
levels. We do so in order to assess how useful the H–O framework is in our
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context. From a theoretical viewpoint, the expectation is straightforward:
since granting labor market access to a given skill group implies more
competition for the same skill group in the respective home country, ego-
centric respondents catering to their material self-interest should prefer not
to offer labor market access to the same skill group. In contrast, offering
labor market access to other skill groups may be viewed as fostering eco-
nomic growth and could thus be perceived as more positive.
Empirical study design
To assess the multidimensionality of trade liberalization empirically, we imple-
mented conjoint experiments, an approach well suited for analyzing multidimen-
sional choices (Green et al. 2001; Hainmueller et al. 2014). The experiments were
embedded in face-to-face interviews administered to national random samples of
the population aged 18 to 64 in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam from
December 2013 to February 2014. Sample sizes were 820 in Costa Rica, 800 in
Nicaragua, and 700 in Vietnam.5
We chose these three countries because despite them being developing
countries they differ greatly with respect to their political system, their
labor and environmental standards and their income. While studying
merely three countries from the Global South clearly sets a strict limit
on how much we can generalize, our intention by selecting such diverse
countries is to enhance external validity as much as possible by showing
that public opinion on PTA characteristics is similar across a wider range
of states that do differ in key underlying political and socio-economic
conditions. While Costa Rica is an upper middle-income economy both
Vietnam and Nicaragua compete in the global arena primarily on the
basis of low skilled labor and natural resources with their low productivity
reflected in low wages (Sala-i-Martin and Schwab 2012). Similarly, both
Nicaragua and Vietnam have rather low environmental and labor stan-
dards and rank mostly at the bottom of Yale’s Environmental
Performance Index (EPI 2014). In contrast, Costa Rica has a long-stand-
ing tradition of social and environmental protection and ranks no. 1 in
Latin America and no. 25 in the world on the Social Progress Index
measuring environmental and social performance alongside GDP (Porter
et al. 2014). With respect to political rights, however, it is Costa Rica and
Nicaragua that are both democratic whereas Vietnam has a one-party
autocratic system (Marshall et al. 2006). In 2007, Costa Rica even held a
5Whereas our surveys in Costa Rica and Nicaragua included the entire country, we focused the sampling in Vietnam
to the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) areas, which also include large rural districts. The latter restriction was
necessary for logistical and cost reasons. As shown by Bernauer and Nguyen (2015) the socio-demographics of
these two areas are very similar to the socio-demographics of the country as a whole and should therefore not
bias our results.
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nation-wide referendum whether to ratify the Free Trade Agreement
between the Dominican Republic, Central America and the United
States – DR-CAFTA – a first for a developing country (Hicks, Milner,
and Tingley 2014). An overview of the main characteristics of and differ-
ences between the three countries, which formed the basis of our country
selection – can be found in the Online Appendix Part 1.
We used a particular variety of conjoint analysis, called choice-based
conjoint analysis. Participants in our surveys were confronted, in stylized
form, with two potential trade agreements at a time, shown side by side.
These two agreements varied with respect to the 11 different character-
istics (attributes) displayed in Table 1. Respondents were then asked to
state which of the two agreements they prefer and to express on a seven-
point scale how much they like each of the two agreements. The latter
measure is valuable because the choice-based measure alone does not tell
us the degree to which a respondent prefers one potential agreement over
the other. Furthermore, the choice based measure does not take into
account cases where a respondent prefers or dislikes both agreements
equally. Consequently, either respondent choices for or against a specific
agreement or their rating of this agreement form our dependent variable,
while PTA dimensions correspond to the explanatory variables in our
hypotheses.
Respondents were asked to complete five choice tasks in total, each of
which consisted of profiles of two potential trade agreements with a fixed set
of attributes whose values varied between and across the choice tasks. Table 2
shows an example of such a choice task for the case of Vietnam. Hence for
each choice task respondents saw two new agreement profiles with randomly
inserted values for each of the 11 attributes. Because the attribute values are
randomly assigned, it allows the identification of the causal effect – the
Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) – of each attribute value on
the probability that a particular agreement will be chosen or rated as more or
less desirable (Hainmueller et al. 2014).
Table 2. Example of conjoint choice task – Vietnam.
Characteristic PTA 1 PTA 2
Numbers of countries involved 2 150
The agreement also includes Brazil China
Prices of the goods you buy will stay the same decrease
Employment in the agricultural sector will increase increase
Employment in the manufacturing sector will increase stay the same
Employment in the service sector will stay the same stay the same
Environmental protection standards will increase stay the same
Labor protection standards will increase increase
Foreign citizens with high skills will be allowed to work in Vietnam yes no
Foreign citizens with medium skills will be allowed to work in Vietnam yes no
Foreign citizens with low skills will be allowed to work in Vietnam no yes
Which agreement would you prefer?
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The conjoint part of the survey started with a short introductory text on
what PTAs are and instructions on how to complete the choice tasks.6 The
respondents then saw a table describing each of the 11 attributes (similar to
Table 1) before proceeding to the actual choice tasks (for further details, see
Online Appendix Part 2). Using this setup, the unit of analysis is the single
agreement profile. Since each individual completed five choice tasks consist-
ing of two agreement profiles we have a maximum of five times two times
number of respondents, that is 8200 observations in the case of Costa Rica,
8000 for Nicaragua, and 7000 for Vietnam. We rescaled the seven-point scale
of the second dependent variable, where 1 indicates that the respondent
would “never support” such an agreement and 7 indicates that she would
“always support” such an agreement, to range from 0 to 1. Following
Hainmueller et al. (2014), we estimate the AMCEs by regressing either the
choice or the ranking variable on the different values of the attributes (for
example whether the agreement will reduce employment in the agricultural
sector), each of which is measured in binary form. Standard errors are
clustered on the respondent to account for the non-independence of their
(2 × 5) choices.
One potential issue with our conjoint experiment design pertains to the
number of attributes. The existing literature offers no clear guidelines on how
many attributes at what level of complexity are meaningful (Green et al.
2001; Hainmueller et al. 2014). Many studies use 6–12 attributes. Since we
specified our attributes in rather simple terms we decided to opt for a
relatively large number of attributes. The advantage is that this makes the
set of PTA characteristics quite realistic. During our intensive pre-test phase
based on pilot studies with samples recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk,
we carefully checked that individuals are able to fully understand the respec-
tive dimensions of PTAs and are clearly able to differentiate between them.
At the extreme, cognitively overburdening respondents with too many and
too complex attributes is most likely to result in all treatment effects becom-
ing insignificant (to the extent respondents then simply perceive “noise”).
The results reported below show that this is clearly not the case because the
majority of PTA design features have significant effects. Besides, we checked
whether effects decrease (or increase) as study participants complete the five
choice tasks. We do not observe such effects. Overall, therefore, we believe
that our conjoint design works sufficiently well.
6The introductory text was: Costa Rica is currently negotiating international trade agreements with other countries.
The purpose of such trade agreements is to make it easier for producers from other countries to sell their goods
and services in Costa Rica (imports), and to make it easier for producers based in Costa Rica to sell their goods
and services in other countries (exports). Trade agreements may involve smaller or larger groups of countries.
They may cover different economic sectors. And they may have different effects on the economies of the
countries involved.
We are interested in what kinds of international trade agreements you prefer.
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On a much more general note though, critics have been pointing out that
it is very challenging to measure and explain citizens’ preferences toward
trade policy in a reliable and meaningful way because citizens know rather
little about trade issues (Guisinger 2009). We agree to some extent with this
concern, which of course applies to virtually all research on mass public
attitudes toward policy issues of almost any type, not only trade policy.
However, as shown by a lot of existing research on this issue (for an overview
on public opinion research see Lupia 2015), citizens do hold relatively clear
and stable opinions even on rather complex policy issues (for example trade
policy). We thus believe that careful design of surveys can generate reliable
and substantively meaningful information on mass public opinion on trade
issues, including PTAs.
In our specific case, we used everyday language in the survey pre-tested
in pilot tests, so that “ordinary” people with little knowledge on trade
issues could well understand the survey items. It is also worth mentioning
in this context that survey experiments like ours do not presume that
every citizen forms her/his preference toward PTAs based on a systematic
evaluation according to the exact same criteria we based our survey
experiment on (for example the attributes in the conjoint analysis).
Rather, experiments like ours evaluate how citizens form their preferences
when confronted with a set of criteria for evaluation. The effects of our
attributes in the conjoint analysis, for instance, tell us how citizens are
likely to evaluate PTAs and which criteria are likely to matter more or less
in this regard. Moreover, in assessing the robustness of our findings we
explicitly look at whether differing levels of education as a proxy of prior
knowledge on trade issues (see Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006) moderate
the role PTA attributes play in individuals’ evaluation. The results are very
similar, meaning that the level of prior knowledge on trade issues has only
a weak moderating effect. Taken together, we believe that designing a
survey experiment along these lines can generate robust and interesting
information on mass public attitudes toward PTAs.
Results
We start our discussion of the results with an overview of the overall
popularity of PTAs. Relying on the rating task in the conjoint experiments,
we can obtain an overall measure of how much individuals support PTAs in
general. Figure 1 shows support levels across all potential trade agreements
for the three samples. The bars in the three panels indicate how many of the
proposed (stylized) PTAs were rated as “1,” implying no support at all for
this PTA, to “7,” implying strong support for this particular PTA. While in
all three countries a majority of respondents are in favor of PTAs in general,
in the sense that they rate PTAs (with any attributes) with a score of 4 and
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higher, clearly PTAs seem to be more popular in Nicaragua and Vietnam
than in Costa Rica.
Turning to the specific findings for the three countries, Figures 2.1–2.3
illustrate the results for the conjoint experiment for each country. In all
figures dots represent the estimates for each attribute on the probability
that an individual chose the respective PTA profile. Horizontal lines repre-
sent the 95% confidence intervals. Each attribute can be interpreted relative
to the (omitted) baseline category, which is depicted as a dot on the vertical
zero line.
In contrast to our theoretical expectations, people tend to prefer agree-
ments with more over agreements with fewer countries. Hence our theore-
tical argumentation that individuals associate agreements including more
countries with higher levels of uncertainty does not receive support.
Moreover, with the exception of the United States in the case of Costa Rica
and Nicaragua, all other countries are less preferred trading partners than the
EU. Since the EU is rather far away from all three countries in terms of
geographic distance, this effect seems to reflect the general positive image of
the EU as potential trading partner. As described above, despite them being
neighboring countries, Nicaraguans are not judged favorably in Costa Rica
and vice versa due to historical animosities. This is clearly reflected in our
results as Costa Rica, in the case of Nicaragua, and Nicaragua in the case of
Figure 1. Overall support levels across all possible PTAs.
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Costa Rica are associated with one of the worst trading partner images. In
Vietnam, the least preferred trading partner turned out to be China, which
probably reflects the strained relations between both countries due to their
military–security rivalry. Furthermore, this second facet of scale of liberal-
ization clearly dominates all other PTA characteristics in terms of effect size.
As expected, reducing prices has a substantive and significant effect in all
three countries. However, as we have discussed above, the question is not so
much whether people will find price reduction attractive but rather how large
the effect is compared to other features of trade liberalization, that is prices’
relative importance. Interestingly, while reducing prices is one of the most
substantial effects – about an eight percentage point increase in support of a
PTA which reduces prices – this effect is not significantly larger than those
concerning employment, for example.
With regard to employment, we also observe that PTAs expected to create
more employment are clearly preferred. In contrast to earlier studies on the
importance of the agricultural sector (Naoi and Kume 2011), we do not find
that employment considerations in agriculture are especially important.
Rather to the contrary, effect sizes for agriculture are slightly, though not
significantly, smaller than for manufacturing and services. It might be that
Figure 2.1. Costa Rica.
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this finding is due to our empirical focus on developing countries. Most
existing studies on protectionism in the agricultural sector are based on
evidence from industrialized countries (Jensen and Shin 2014; Naoi and
Kume 2011). Thus it might be that agricultural protectionism is not that
pronounced in countries of the Global South. Yet, without comparative data
this is difficult to evaluate and could therefore be the focus of future research.
Moreover, we also do not find significant support for the argument that
individuals value employment creation mostly in their own sector. As sum-
marized in Table 3, most individuals seem to value job creation in all three
sectors independent of their own sector of employment. While for several
sectors, for example, the services sector in Costa Rica or Nicaragua, indivi-
duals have a slight preference for agreements creating more employment in
their own, that is the services sector, this effect is not statistically different
from employment creation in the other sectors (see also Figures A.2.1 to
Figure 2.2. Nicaragua.
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A.4.3 in the Online Appendix Part 2). The only exception is individuals
working in the agricultural sector in Vietnam (Figure A.4.3): These respon-
dents have a clear preference for those PTAs increasing employment in the
agricultural sector. Overall, however, the sectoral dimension, as highlighted
by the R–V framework, does not seem to play a very prominent role in the
three countries studied in this analysis.
Turning to labor and environmental standards, our results do not
offer support for the perspective that individuals in developing countries
do not attach much importance to such standards. In all three countries,
individuals prefer PTAs either maintaining or increasing worker and/or
environmental rights. Furthermore, in all three countries the effect sizes
of the environmental and labor standard dimensions are about similar to
those of the economic dimensions, such as price and employment
effects.
Figure 2.3. Vietnam.
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As to migration provisions, we see, for the first time, some significant
country variation. While in all three countries we observe a preference for
low-skilled labor migration, only in Vietnam also high- and medium-skilled
individuals are preferred immigrants. In contrast, in Nicaragua individuals
do not prefer high-skill labor migration and in Costa Rica individuals do not
prefer medium-skill labor migration. One interpretation is that Costa Rica,
being a middle-income country, is no longer abundant in low-skilled labor
but has already reached a medium-skill level. This means that its citizens, on
average, may prefer not to compete with medium-skilled immigrants.
To fully understand how citizens’ skill level impacts their preferences for
migration, the last two rows in Table 3 summarize the conditional results
(corresponding figures are displayed in the Online Appendix Part 2). While,
overall, most respondents tend to value immigration by all skill types, we
observe some interesting variation according to respondents’ own skill level.
Following the predictions of the H–O framework, we argued above that
individuals should prefer other skill groups to enter the country but prefer
to restrict immigration for individuals of their own skill group. However,
overall, we do not find much evidence for such a competition logic of
immigration. In both Costa Rica and Nicaragua, high-skilled respondents
favor especially PTAs that offer working permits for high- and medium-
skilled individuals. Furthermore, in all three countries low-skilled individuals
prefer PTAs offering working permits for low-skilled individuals. Only high-
skilled respondents in Vietnam correspond to the competition logic since
they tend to favor medium- and low-skilled worker access, but do not prefer
PTAs offering working permits for individuals with high skills.
Discussion
Although citizens only rarely vote directly and specifically on interna-
tional trade issues, public opinion plays an important role in trade policy-
making (Kono 2008; Mansfield and Milner 2012). As trade liberalization
efforts in recent years have increasingly shifted from the global to regional
and bilateral levels, the specifics of (potential) trade agreements have
moved to the forefront of public discourse on this topic. The current
public backlash in both the United States and Europe with regard to
several trade agreements presently under negotiation, such as the TPP
and the TTIP, demonstrates the importance of understanding what con-
siderations are shaping citizens’ attitudes with respect to PTAs. However,
public debate on PTAs is not confined to advanced industrialized coun-
tries. Costa Rica, for example, held a national referendum on ratification
of the Free Trade Agreement between the Dominican Republic, Central
America, and the United States (DR-CAFTA; see Hicks, Milner, and
Tingley 2014).
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Our existing knowledge on what drives public opinion on trade issues
is mostly confined to industrialized countries, however, and is based
largely on an approach that considers public opinion on trade liberal-
ization in a one-dimensional way, ranging from support to opposition. In
this examination, we strove to broaden our understanding of trade pre-
ferences by experimentally studying, in the context of PTAs, the multi-
dimensionality of individual level trade preferences. While PTAs are of
course meant and designed to liberalize trade, they also cover a range of
other issues that are directly or indirectly related to trade liberalization.
These properties constitute a perfect setting for conceptualizing and
empirically studying them in terms of preferences over a multi-dimen-
sional policy space.
Using choice-based conjoint experiments, in which we confront respon-
dents, in stylized form, with potential PTAs, we find that independent of
their country of origin respondents in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and
Table 3. Overview of conditional results.
Costa Rica Nicaragua Vietnam
Respondent works in
agricultural sector
Dislikes no effects for
agricultural sector
No statistical differences prefers job increases in:
● Agriculture
Respondent works in
manufacturing
sector
prefers job increases in:
● Manufacturing and
services
● Slight preference for
own sector but not
significant
prefers job increases in:
● Services
prefers job increases in:
● Manufacturing and
services
● Slight preference for
own sector but not
significant
Respondent works in
services sector
prefers job increases in:
● All sectors
● Slight preference for
own sector but not
significant
prefers job increases in:
● All sectors
● Slight preference for
own sector but not
significant
prefers job increases in:
● All sectors
Respondent has
higher education
prefers working permits
for:
● High-skilled individuals
● Medium-skilled
individuals
prefers working permits
for:
● High-skilled individuals
● Medium-skilled
individuals
● Low-skilled individuals
prefers working permits
for:
● Medium-skilled
individuals
● Low-skilled individuals
Respondent has no
higher education
prefers working permits
for:
● High-skilled individuals
● Low-skilled individuals
prefers working permits
for:
● Medium-skilled
individuals
● Low-skilled individuals
prefers working permits
for:
● High-skilled individuals
● Medium-skilled
individuals
● Low-skilled individuals
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Vietnam tend to favor rather similar trade agreements, though overall
levels of PTA support differ quite strongly. In all three countries, the most
important factor shaping people’s trade preferences is sympathy or rather
antipathy toward particular other countries. Furthermore, conventional
political economy explanations, which were developed in view of one-
dimensional trade policy preferences, have merely about the same expla-
natory power as non-economic considerations, such as environmental and
labor standards. While we expected that price and employment effects of
PTAs might crowd out effects of environmental and labor standards, this
is empirically not the case. In contrast, despite being developing countries,
which is typically highlighted in post-materialist explanations as leading to
a lower priority of environmental and labor concerns, respondents in all
three countries prefer trade agreements that maintain or even increase
labor and environmental standards.
Our evaluation of the implications of both the H–O and the R–V
frameworks resulted in rather limited support for these models. First,
and in some contrast to the predictions derived from the H–O framework,
individuals favored PTAs offering labor market access to all types of
workers. Only in Vietnam did respondents prefer not to offer working
permits to foreign workers from the same skill group. Hence only in
Vietnam, but not in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, do experimental findings
align with a competition logic suggesting that individuals prefer not to
compete with foreign workers of the same skill group. Moreover, we do
Figure 3. Potential support for PTAs.
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not find support for the idea that individuals mostly value employment
creation in their own sector, which would be in line with the predictions
of the R–V framework. Rather, individuals dislike job losses independent
of the sector concerned.
At least three policy implications emerge from this study. First, our
results imply that despite current debates surrounding PTAs, such as the
TPP and the TTIP agreements, it seems possible to design trade agree-
ments in ways that engender public support. To illustrate this point,
Figure 3 shows for each of the countries the support levels for a
hypothetical PTA corresponding to the worst7 and to the best-case8
scenario. This shows that potential support ranges widely, for example
in the case of Costa Rica, from a low of 0.29% to a high of 0.74%. This
suggests that policy-makers have considerable room to maneuver in
selecting contents and participants of PTAs that are appealing to citi-
zens. While we acknowledge that there are clear limits to changing
support for PTAs by adjusting their design, still there is important
variation. Hence though it might not be possible to make a clear PTA
skeptic accept PTAs if only the specific PTA had a favorable design, for
citizens with no extreme views on trade liberalization design features
could indeed make the decisive difference.
Second, trade preferences seem to be rather consistent across the three
countries, despite strong differences in macro-economic and political con-
texts. These similarities imply that policy-makers in different developing
countries might be able to rely on somewhat similar strategies to increase
support for PTAs, though our results by no means imply that simple tweaks
in PTA signs will necessarily have massive implications for public support.
Third and finally, while the existing literature on trade policy preferences
and mass public opinion in this area has largely focused on the economic
effects of PTAs, our results suggest that non-economic dimensions of trade
liberalization are at least as important. While such issues have been largely
sidelined in global trade liberalization efforts in the framework of the WTO,
evidence from PTA negotiations over the past decade suggests that resolving
conflicting positions on non-economic issues is very challenging indeed, and
perhaps more challenging than resolving differences over the conventional
market access issues. From the perspective of policy-makers, this requires
careful ex-ante (before embarking on negotiations) considerations of trade-
offs between economic gains from PTAs and the political feasibility of deal-
ing with non-economic issues in ways that result in sufficient support from
7For Costa Rica this is a PTA with Nicaragua that would decrease both environmental and worker rights standards,
increase prices, reduce jobs in all three sectors and would not allow for any type of immigration. For Nicaragua
and Vietnam the respective countries would be Costa Rica or India respectively.
8For all countries this is a PTA with the US that would increase both environmental and worker rights standards,
decrease prices, increase jobs in all three sectors and would allow for all types of immigration.
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domestic constituencies. Controversy over non-trade issues in the past and
ongoing efforts to establish PTAs has also shown that mass public opinion
matters particularly with respect to non-economic issues, and that policy-
making can benefit from increased knowledge on how economic and non-
economic implications of trade liberalization shape public opinion
formation.
Finally, it is worth mentioning caveats and options for further research. The
most obvious limitation is the focus on three (albeit very different) developing
countries. The fact that our findings are similar for all three countries under
study suggests that our results are likely to be relevant to other developing
countries as well. However, empirical demonstration of such relevance will
require survey experiments in other parts of the Global South. It would also
be interesting to carry out similar research for advanced industrialized coun-
tries. One particular issue worth investigating for the latter countries could, for
instance, be the extent to which PTA design attributes matter for public support
in countries characterized by high levels of political polarization, for instance
the United States. Such research could provide interesting insights into how
existing or prospective PTAs could be (re-)designed in order to increase
acceptance among particular types of citizens.
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